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In Bayesian brain theories, hierarchically related pre-
diction errors (PEs) play a central role for predicting
sensory inputs and inferring their underlying causes,
e.g., the probabilistic structure of the environment
and its volatility. Notably, PEs at different hierarchical
levels may be encoded by different neuromodulatory
transmitters. Here, we tested this possibility in
computational fMRI studies of audio-visual learning.
Using a hierarchical Bayesian model, we found that
low-level PEs about visual stimulus outcome were
reflected by widespread activity in visual and supra-
modal areas but also in the midbrain. In contrast,
high-level PEs about stimulus probabilities were en-
coded by the basal forebrain. These findings were
replicated in two groups of healthy volunteers. While
our fMRI measures do not reveal the exact neuron
types activated in midbrain and basal forebrain,
they suggest a dichotomy between neuromodulatory
systems, linking dopamine to low-level PEs about
stimulus outcome and acetylcholine tomore abstract
PEs about stimulus probabilities.
INTRODUCTION
The notion that the brain has evolved to implement a predictive
machinery for anticipation of future events has existed since
early cybernetic theories (Ashby, 1952). The mechanisms by
which the brain learns the probabilistic structure of the world
have been examined primarily from the perspective of reinforce-
ment learning (RL), with a focus on how reward learning is driven
by prediction errors (PEs) (Fletcher et al., 2001; McClure et al.,
2003; O’Doherty et al., 2003; Pessiglione et al., 2006;Wunderlich
et al., 2011). Another perspective is provided by theories that
view the brain as approximating optimal Bayesian inference
(Dayan et al., 1995; Doya et al., 2011; Friston, 2009; Knill and
Pouget, 2004; Ko¨rding and Wolpert, 2006). These theories go
beyond reward learning and have been applied to many aspects
of perception as, for example, in theories of ‘‘predictive coding’’(Rao and Ballard, 1999) and the ‘‘free energy principle’’ (Friston
et al., 2006).
A central postulate of these Bayesian perspectives is that the
brain continuously updates a hierarchical generative model of its
sensory inputs to predict future events and infer on the causal
structure of the world. This belief updating process rests on mul-
tiple, hierarchically related PEs that are weighted by their preci-
sion. Notably, these PEs are not restricted to reward, but
concern all types of sensory events as well as their underlying
‘‘laws,’’ e.g., probabilistic associations and how these change
in time (volatility; Behrens et al., 2007). Simply speaking, esti-
mates of environmental volatility are updated in proportion to
PEs about stimulus probabilities; in turn, estimates of stimulus
probabilities are updated by PEs about stimulus occurrences.
While several empirical studies have examined human
behavior and brain activity from this Bayesian perspective, the
hierarchical nature of PEs has received little attention so far.
This is a significant gap, not only because hierarchically related
PEs are at the heart of the Bayesian formalism, but also because
PEs at different hierarchical levels may be linked to different neu-
romodulatory transmitter systems. While dopamine (DA) has
long been related to the encoding of PEs about reward (Daw
and Doya, 2006; Schultz et al., 1997), other modulatory neuro-
transmitters have been linked tomore abstract roles, such as en-
coding of ‘‘expected uncertainty’’ by acetylcholine (ACh) (Yu and
Dayan, 2002, 2005). Notably, this was (implicitly) operationalized
as a higher-level PE in that it represents the difference between a
conditional probability (degree of cue validity) and certainty.
Other computational concepts of ACh suggested that it may
be representing the learning rate (Doya, 2002). Again, this notion
can be related to hierarchical Bayesian accounts where the
learning rate at any given level is proportional to the precision
of predictions and evolves under the influence of the next higher
level in the hierarchy (Mathys et al., 2011). This weighting by pre-
cision (a form of adaptive scaling) is crucial and has been
described for DA responses to reward (Tobler et al., 2005) and
novelty (Bunzeck et al., 2010). Such a function may generalize
across neuromodulators: it has been suggested that both DA
and AChmay be involved in the precision-weighting of PEs (Fris-
ton, 2009; Friston et al., 2012).
Here, we present behavioral and fMRI studies that examine
possible links between neuromodulatory systems and hierarchi-
cal precision-weighted PEs during associative learning. TheNeuron 80, 519–530, October 16, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 519
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Figure 1. Task Design and Model
(A) Task design. Subjects had to predict within 800 ms (behavioral study), 1,000 ms (first fMRI study), or 1,200 ms (second fMRI study) which visual stimulus (face
or house) followed an auditory cue (high or low tone). In the behavioral study and first fMRI study, a monetary reward (0.05 or 5.00 Swiss Francs coin) was
randomly presented in one of the four corners. The type of coin presentedwas uncorrelated to visual stimulus outcome andwas omitted in the second fMRI study.
(B) Black: time-varying cue-outcome contingency, including strongly predictive cues (probabilities of 0.9 and 0.1), moderately predictive cues (0.7, 0.3) and
nonpredictive cues (0.5); red: example of a subject-specific trajectory of the posterior expectation of visual category.
(C) HGF: generative model. x1 represents the stimulus identity (category), x2 the cue-outcome contingency (the conditional probability of the visual stimulus given
the auditory cue) in logit space, and x3 represents the log-volatility of the environment. See Equations 2, 3, and 4 and Table S2.
See also Figures S1, S2, and S3 and Tables S1, S2, S4, S5, and S6.
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model, the Hierarchical Gaussian Filter (HGF) (Mathys et al.,
2011), which does not assume fixed ‘‘ideal’’ learning across sub-
jects but contains subject-specific parameters that couple the
hierarchical levels and allow for individual expression of (approx-
imate) Bayes-optimal learning. Using the subject-specific
learning trajectories, we examined whether activity in neuromo-
dulatory nuclei could be explained by precision-weighted PEs,
and if so, at which hierarchical level. In particular, we focused
on dopaminergic and cholinergic nuclei, using anatomical masks
specifically developed for these regions. Importantly, we exam-
ined 118 healthy volunteers from three separate samples, two of
which underwent fMRI (n = 45 and n = 27, respectively). This
enabled us to verify the robustness of our results and test which
of them would replicate across samples.
RESULTS
We report findings obtained from three separate samples of
healthy volunteers undergoing purely behavioral assessment
(n = 46) or combined fMRI-behavior (n = 45 and n = 27). All three
studies used a simple associative audio-visual learning task
where participants had to learn the time-varying predictive
strengths of auditory cues and predict upcoming visual stimuli520 Neuron 80, 519–530, October 16, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc.(faces or houses) by button press (Figure 1). This task required
hierarchical learning about stimulus occurrences, stimulus prob-
abilities, and volatility that we modeled as a hierarchical
Bayesian belief updating process, using a standard HGF with
three levels (Mathys et al., 2011); see Experimental Procedures
for details.
Modeling of Behavioral Data
In a first step, we used random effects Bayesian model selec-
tion (BMS) (Stephan et al., 2009) to examine the possibility
that our subjects might have engaged in a different cognitive
process than intended, or may have used a different model
than hypothesized. In the behavioral study and first fMRI study,
we tried to ensure constant motivation of our participants by
associating each trial with a monetary reward whose potential
pay-out at the end of the experiment depended on successful
prediction of the visual outcome (face or house). Even though
subjects were explicitly instructed that these reward were
random and orthogonal to the visual outcomes, one may
wonder whether subjects’ learning might nevertheless have
been driven by (implicit) prediction of these trial-wise reward.
To exclude this possibility, we compared a three-level HGF
assuming that audio-visual associations were learned and
guided subjects’ behavior (HGF1; Figure 1C) to a second HGF
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trial-wise reward (HGF2).
A second question was whether our participants were indeed
engaging in hierarchical learning and updating their learning rate
dynamically, as our Bayesian model assumed, or used a simpler
learning mechanism. To clarify this, we added two more models
to our comparison set. The models were a Bayesian model with
reduced hierarchical depth (HGF3) in which the third level was
eliminated from the hierarchy, and a standard Rescorla-Wagner
(RL) model with a fixed learning rate. Finally, we implemented a
RLmodel with dynamic learning rate (Sutton, 1992) that was rec-
ommended by one of the reviewers as a non-Bayesian alterna-
tive to HGF1. See the Supplemental Experimental Procedures
section C (available online) for more information on these
models.
Comparing these five models, we found that, across studies,
HGF1 was the superior model in 86 out of our 118 participants.
Examining each study separately, random effects BMS yielded
posterior model probabilities of 84% (behavioral study), 74%
(first fMRI study), and 72% (second fMRI study) for HGF1, which
was five to ten times higher than for the next best model in each
case (Table S1). As a consequence, in each study, the exceed-
ance probability in favor of HGF1 (i.e., the probability that its
posterior probability was higher than that of any other model
considered) (Stephan et al., 2009) was indistinguishable from
100%. These results provide strong evidence that our partici-
pants did learn the task-relevant conditional probabilities of vi-
sual stimuli (instead of predicting the incidental reward) and
were capable of updating their learning rate dynamically.
We next examined the estimates of the free parameters (k, w, z)
from the winning model (Table S2). These estimates were com-
parable across the three studies, as demonstrated by ANOVA:
none of the model parameters showed significant differences
across studies (k: F(2,115) = 1.04, p = 0.358; w: F(2,115) =
0.91, p = 0.405; z: F(2,115) = 2.98, p = 0.055). Additionally, we
used multiple regression to evaluate how well our model ex-
plained subjects’ behavior (percentage of correct responses).
This quantified model performance in terms of variance ex-
plained, complementary to the relative model comparison by
BMS above. This analysis showed that the linear combination
of the three model parameters predicted subjects’ task perfor-
mance well (behavioral study: R2 = 0.64, F(3,42) = 25.3, p <
0.001; first fMRI study: R2 = 0.59, F(3,41) = 20.1, p < 0.001; sec-
ond fMRI study: R2 = 0.63, F(3,23) = 13.2, p < 0.001).
fMRI Data Analysis
As detailed in the Experimental Procedures section, our fMRI
analysis focused on precision-weighted PEs and uncertainty es-
timates across the hierarchical levels of the HGF. For each of
these variables, our analysis proceeded in three steps (see
Experimental Procedures): first, we performed whole-brain ana-
lyses; second, we focused on our anatomically defined regions
of interest (ROIs), using a combined mask of dopaminergic and
cholinergic nuclei in the brain stem and subcortex; finally, we
conducted these fMRI analyses separately in two independent
samples of n = 45 and n = 27 volunteers. Note that we only
report those findings that survived stringent family-wise error
(FWE) peak-level correction for multiple tests (p < 0.05) andthat could be replicated across studies. Replication was as-
sessed using a voxel-wise ‘‘logical AND’’ operation on the
FWE-thresholded activation maps from both fMRI studies, and
only those activations are being reported in which this proce-
dure showed an overlap of significant activations in both fMRI
studies.
Low-Level Precision-Weighted Prediction Errors
Initially, we examined the precision-weighted PE about visual
stimulus outcome, ε2 (for mathematical details, see Experimental
Procedures and the Supplemental Experimental Procedures,
section A). In both fMRI studies, our whole-brain analyses
demonstrated significant activations in a widely distributed set
of regions (Table 1; Figure 2). In addition to the visual cortex
(around the calcarine sulcus), the activity of numerous supramo-
dal regions correlated positively with trial-wise estimates of ε2,
including the middle and inferior frontal gyri, anterior cingulate
cortex (ACC), intraparietal sulcus (IPS), and anterior insula, all
located bilaterally. Perhaps the most notable finding, however,
was a significant activation of the midbrain (ventral tegmental
area [VTA]/substantia nigra [SN]). In both fMRI studies, this
VTA/SN activation not only survived FWE correction within our
anatomically defined mask, but also across the whole brain
(p < 0.05; Figure 3). This finding is remarkable because the pre-
cision-weighted PE ε2 concerns a purely sensory event: the
visual stimulus category predicted by the auditory cue. This
conclusion is supported by the BMS analysis of the behavioral
data described above that demonstrated that in the first fMRI
study subjects were not trying to predict reward but visual out-
comes. Furthermore, in the second fMRI, study rewards were
omitted entirely while keeping sensory stimulation and task de-
mands identical.
Interestingly, as implied by predictive coding theories (cf. Fris-
ton, 2005), regions whose activity correlated positively with PEs
about visual inputs considerably overlapped with regions that
activated on each trial, regardless of the computational state
and stimulus category (‘‘task execution per se’’). Figure 4 shows
the results of a nested conjunction analysis: this combined the
conjunction analyses of contrasts testing for task execution
per se (i.e., a statistical contrast on the base regressor encoding
trial events, not the parametric modulators) and for ε2, respec-
tively, across both fMRI studies. These results indicated that in
both studies, primary visual cortex (calcarine sulcus), bilateral
IPS, right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), and right ante-
rior insula were activated by the task per se and by precision-
weighted PEs about stimulus category. Please note that this
is an extremely conservative analysis: all conjunction analyses
tested the conjunction null hypothesis, i.e., a ‘‘logical AND’’
(Nichols et al., 2005), with all contrasts thresholded at p < 0.05
(FWE whole-brain corrected), and the combination of these
conjunctions across both studies corresponded to a double
logical AND.
The results reported so far refer to the outcome prediction er-
ror ε2; this is the (precision-weighted) difference between the
actual visual stimulus outcome and its a priori probability (i.e.,
before trial outcome observation). However, we can also use
the predictions from our model to examine activations reflecting
choice prediction error εch; this is the difference between the cor-
rectness of the subject’s choice and the a priori probability of thisNeuron 80, 519–530, October 16, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 521
Table 1. Whole-Brain Activations by ε2
fMRI study 1 Hemisphere x y z t Score fMRI Study 2 Hemisphere x y z t Score
ε2: Positive Correlation ε2: Positive Correlation
Middle frontal gyrus/ Anterior/
middle cingulate cortex
R 34 8 57 10.25 Middle frontal gyrus R 34 14 55 7.95
Insula R 33 24 3 10.13 Anterior/middle cingulate cortex R 2 30 40 8.91
Inferior parietal cortex R 39 49 45 9.49 Insula R 32 24 3 10.85
Precuneus R 8 69 49 9.00 Inferior parietal cortex R 38 46 46 8.98
Intraparietal sulcus/
inferior parietal cortex
L 28 61 43 8.53 Precuneus R 4 70 46 8.70
Inferior frontal gyrus L 44 26 31 8.25 Intraparietal sulcus/ inferior
parietal cortex
L 28 61 39 7.59
Insula L 30 24 0 7.96 Inferior frontal gyrus L 44 24 33 9.30
Middle frontal gyrus L 28 5 63 7.52 Insula L 28 24 3 9.20
Middle frontal gyrus L 27 50 15 6.30 Middle frontal gyrus L 28 11 60 7.92
Lingual gyrus L 8 78 3 5.55 Middle frontal gyrus L 28 53 13 6.88
Lingual gyrus R 2 78 3 5.36 Lingual gyrus L 12 81 4 5.29
Supramarginal gyrus R 48 48 27 5.40 Lingual gyrus R 2 82 4 5.09
Cerebellum L 30 57 32 5.35 Cerebellum L 30 55 32 6.16
Middle temporal gyrus R 58 30 8 5.21 Supramarginal gyrus R 45 46 25 6.59
VTA / substantia nigra R 3 24 18 5.12 Middle temporal gyrus R 56 30 8 6.18
Prefrontal cortex L 16 14 64 5.00 VTA / substantia nigra R 2 21 18 5.06
Prefrontal cortex L 18 18 66 8.30
All results: p < 0.05 FWE whole-brain corrected. MNI coordinates and t values for regions activated by ε2, the precision-weighted PE about stimulus
outcome, in the first and second fMRI study. Only those activations are listed that were replicated across studies. The activation in the first row consti-
tuted a single cluster in the first study, whereas it was split into two separate clusters in the second study.
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dures, section B, for formal definitions of both PEs).
In both fMRI studies, choice PEs evoked prominent activa-
tions (p < 0.05 FWEwhole-brain corrected; Figure 5) in numerous
regions, including the bilateral ventral striatum, ventromedial
prefrontal cortex, OFC and ACC (for a complete list, see Table
S7). Activations of these regions are commonly found for reward
PEs, and it is remarkable that we obtain a similar activation
pattern even though in our studies learning was orthogonal to
reward (fMRI study 1) and reward were absent (fMRI study 2).
Finally, it is notable that the activation of the ventral striatum
also extended into the basal forebrain, as delineated by our
anatomical mask (p < 0.05 FWE corrected for the entire mask
volume).
High-Level Precision-Weighted Prediction Errors
Subsequently, we investigated precision-weighted PEs at the
next higher level of the hierarchy in our Bayesian model. This
PE, ε3, concerns the cue-outcome contingency, i.e., the proba-
bility (in logit space) of the visual stimulus category given the
auditory cue, and is used to update estimates of log-volatility
at the third level of the HGF. We found that the trial-wise expres-
sion of this PE correlated positively with activity in the septal part
of the cholinergic basal forebrain (Table 2; Figure 6). In both fMRI
studies, this activation was significant (p < 0.05) when corrected
for multiple comparisons across the volume of our anatomically
defined mask (that included all cholinergic and dopaminergic
nuclei in brain stem and subcortex).522 Neuron 80, 519–530, October 16, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc.DISCUSSION
In this study, three independent groups of healthy volunteers (n =
118 in total) performed an audio-visual associative learning task
that required explicit predictions about an upcoming visual stim-
ulus category (face or house) given a preceding auditory cue.
Because the cue-outcome contingencies were varying unpre-
dictably in time, optimal performance required hierarchical
learning about conditional stimulus probabilities and their
change in time.
Our analyses showed that participants were indeed likely to
engage in such a hierarchical learning process. Formal statistical
comparisonof fivealternativemodels indicated that a hierarchical
Bayesian model (a three-level HGF) best explained the observed
behavioral data. Applying the computational trajectories from this
model to fMRI data, we found that precision-weighted PEs about
visual outcome, ε2, were not only encoded by numerous cortical
areas, including dopaminoceptive regions like DLPFC, ACC, and
insula, but alsoby thedopaminergic VTA/SN.Notably,we verified
both statistically and experimentally that these PE responses
concerned visual stimulus categories and not reward. At the
higher level of the model’s hierarchy, precision-weighted PEs
about cue-outcome contingencies (conditional probabilities of
the visual outcome given the auditory cue), ε3, were reflected by
activity in the cholinergic basal forebrain.
Our findings have two important implications. First, our results
are in accordance with a central notion in Bayesian theories of
A B C
first fMRI study
x = 3, y = 25, z = 47
second fMRI study
x = 0, y = 25, z = 47
conjunction across studies
x = 0, y = 25, z = 47
Figure 2. Whole-Brain Activations by ε2
Activations by precision-weighted prediction error about visual stimulus outcome, ε2, in the first fMRI study (A) and the second fMRI study (B). Both activation
maps are shown at a threshold of p < 0.05, FWE corrected for multiple comparisons across the whole brain. To highlight replication across studies, (C) shows the
results of a ‘‘logical AND’’ conjunction, illustrating voxels that were significantly activated in both studies.
See Table S3 for deactivations.
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Ballard, 1999): even seemingly simple processes of perceptual
inference and learning do not rest on a single PE but rely on hier-
archically related PE computations. As a corollary, one would
expect a widespread expression of PEs within the neuronal sys-
tem engaged by a particular task. Indeed, we found a remarkable
overlap of areas involved in the execution of the task and areas
expressing PEs (Figure 4). Second, our findings suggest a poten-
tial dichotomy with regard to the computational roles of DA and
ACh. According to our results, the midbrain may be encoding
outcome-related PEs, independent of extrinsic reward. In
contrast, the basal forebrain may be signaling more abstract
PEs that do not concern sensory outcomes per se but their prob-
abilities. In the following, we will discuss these two implications
in the context of the previous literature.
Since early accounts of general systems theory and cyber-
netics (Ashby, 1952), the notion of PE as a teaching signal for
adaptive behavior has taken an increasingly central place in the-
ories of brain function. In contemporary neuroscience, PEs play
a pivotal role in two frameworks, reinforcement learning (RL)
and Bayesian theories. Studies inspired by RL have largely
focused on the role of reward PEs, suggesting that these are en-
coded by phasic dopamine release from neurons in VTA/SN
(Montague et al., 2004; Schultz et al., 1997). In humans, this
has been supported by fMRI studies that have demonstrated
the presence of reward PE signals in the VTA/SN (e.g., D’Ard-
enne et al., 2008; Diuk et al., 2013; Klein-Flu¨gge et al., 2011)
or in regions targeted by its projections, such as the striatum
(Gla¨scher et al., 2010; McClure et al., 2003; Murray et al.,
2008; O’Doherty et al., 2003; Pessiglione et al., 2006; Schon-
berg et al., 2010).
While RL models have also been used to study PE-dependent
learning in the sensory domain (den Ouden et al., 2009; Law and
Gold, 2009), amore prevalent framework to study perception has
been the ‘‘Bayesian brain hypothesis’’ that the brain constructs
and updates a generative model of its sensory inputs (Doya
et al., 2011). One particular formulation of this hypothesis is pre-dictive coding (Friston, 2005; Rao and Ballard, 1999) that postu-
lates that PEs are weighted by their precision and are computed
at any level of hierarchically organized information processing
cascades, as in sensory systems. This has been examined by
several fMRI studies that contrasted predictable versus unpre-
dictable visual stimuli, finding PE responses in visual areas
specialized for the respective stimuli used (Harrison et al.,
2007; Summerfield and Koechlin, 2008) and precision-weighting
under attention (Kok et al., 2012). Other studies have used an
explicit model of trial-wise PEs, using visual (Egner et al., 2010)
or audio-visual associative learning (den Ouden et al., 2010;
den Ouden et al., 2009) paradigms. Notably, these studies did
not have explicit readouts of subjects’ predictions and used rela-
tively simplemodeling approaches: they either described implicit
learning processes (in the absence of behavioral responses) us-
ing a delta-rule RL model (den Ouden et al., 2009; Egner et al.,
2010), or dealt with indirect measures of prediction (e.g., reaction
times) using an ideal Bayesian observer with a fixed learning tra-
jectory across subjects (den Ouden et al., 2010).
Our present study goes beyond these previous attempts by (1)
requiring explicit trial-by-trial predictions, and (2) characterizing
learning via a hierarchical Bayesian model that provides subject-
and trial-specific estimates of precision-weighted PEs at
different hierarchical levels of computation. Based on these
advances, the present study shows much more widespread
sensory PE responses than previously reported. Replicated in
two separate groups, these responses were not only found in
the visual cortex, but also in many supramodal areas in prefron-
tal, cingulate, parietal, and insular cortex (Figure 2). Whereas a
distribution of reward (Vickery et al., 2011) and value signals
(FitzGerald et al., 2012) across the whole brain have recently
been demonstrated in humans, this has not yet been shown, to
our knowledge, for PEs; in this case, precision-weighted PEs
about the sensory outcome (visual stimuli).
Perhaps themost interesting aspect of our findings on sensory
outcome PEs, ε2, was the significant activation of the midbrain.
In humans, strong empirical evidence exists for DA involvementNeuron 80, 519–530, October 16, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 523
A B
first fMRI study second fMRI study
C
conjunction z = -18
Figure 3. Midbrain Activation by ε2
Activation of the dopaminergic VTA/SN associ-
ated with precision-weighted prediction error
about stimulus category, ε2. This activation is
shown both at p < 0.05 FWEwhole-brain corrected
(red) and p < 0.05 FWE corrected for the volume of
our anatomical mask comprising both dopami-
nergic and cholinergic nuclei (yellow).
(A) Results from the first fMRI study.
(B) Second fMRI study.
(C) Conjunction (logical AND) across both studies.
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1997) and novelty (Bunzeck and Du¨zel, 2006). In animal
studies, dopaminergic midbrain responses to visual stimuli
have been reported in the absence of reward; however, this
required that the stimuli were novel, arousing or physically similar
to reward-related stimuli (Horvitz, 2000; Redgrave and Gurney,
2006; Schultz, 1998). In contrast, in our study the VTA/SN
responses scaled with trial-by-trial precision-weighted PE
about the stimulus category; these were neither reward-related,
arousing nor novel (we kept repeating two to four face and
house stimuli in each study). One could think of VTA/SN activity
reflecting conditional novelty (Bayesian surprise); however,
this is not a tight link because ε2 is only related but not iden-
tical to Bayesian surprise (see Supplemental Experimental
Procedures).
An important caveat is that we cannot claim with certainty
that the midbrain activation we found specifically reflects the
activity of DA neurons in VTA/SN because this region is not
homogenous in its cellular composition and also contains
glutamatergic and GABAergic neurons (Nair-Roberts et al.,
2008). In particular, our anatomical mask does not distinguish
pars compacta and pars reticularis of the SN; the latter
contains GABAergic neurons whose contribution to the
blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) signal is not well
understood (Logothetis, 2008). While multimodal investigations
have demonstrated good correspondence between striatal DA
release and BOLD signal in VTA/SN in response to reward PEs
or novel stimuli (see Du¨zel et al., 2009 for review), this relation
still remains to be established for sensory PEs. Similar caveats
apply to our findings on the basal forebrain, which also con-
tains other neurons than only cholinergic ones (Zaborszky
et al., 2008).
With this caveat in mind, our study suggests that in humans
the dopaminergic midbrain may not only encode PEs about
reward, but also precision-weighted PEs about purely sensory
outcomes. To our knowledge, similar midbrain activations have
not been reported in previous studies on reward-unrelated
learning (e.g., d’Acremont et al., 2013; Gla¨scher et al., 2010).
Notably, our experiments were designed to detect brainstem ac-
tivations, including an optimized fMRI sequence and careful
correction for physiological (cardiac and respiratory) noise.
Last but not least, our studies had considerably larger sample
sizes, and consequently higher statistical power, than previous
fMRI studies on reward-unrelated learning.
It is worth mentioning that the recent study by Ide et al. (2013),
which reports activity for unsigned PEs (Bayesian surprise) in524 Neuron 80, 519–530, October 16, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc.ACC during a Go/NoGo task, does show a midbrain activation
(their Figure 3); however, this is not a sensory PE but reflects a
main effect of stop versus go trials. Another recent fMRI study
(Payzan-LeNestour et al., 2013) on neuromodulatory mecha-
nisms during learning focused on different forms of uncertainty
and on the noradrenergic system but did not report any findings
related to PEs, nor to DA or ACh, as in this study.
In animal studies, disentangling responses to sensory and
reward aspects of stimuli is often difficult because stimulus-
bound reward are required to maintain motivation (Maunsell,
2004). In our study, however, the finding of a sensory PE
response in the midbrain cannot easily be explained by any (hid-
den) reward effect since we controlled for the potential influence
of reward in two ways. In the first fMRI study, we orthogonalized
reward delivery to the task-relevant predictions about visual
stimuli; additionally, we verified by model comparison that our
subjects’ decisions were unlikely to be driven by reward predic-
tions. In our second fMRI study, we entirely omitted any reward,
yet found exactly the same VTA/SN response to PEs about visual
stimuli as in the first fMRI study (Figure 3).
Beyond PEs about visual stimulus category, our hierarchical
model also enabled us to examine higher-level PEs. Specifically,
in both fMRI studies, we found a significant activation of the
cholinergic basal forebrain by the precision-weighted PE ε3
about conditional probabilities (of the visual stimulus given the
auditory cue) or, equivalently, cue-outcome contingencies.
This finding provides a new perspective on possible computa-
tional roles of ACh. In the previous literature, the release of
acetylcholine has been associated with a diverse range of func-
tions, including working memory (Hasselmo, 2006), attention
(Demeter and Sarter, 2013), or learning (Dayan, 2012; Doya,
2002).
A recent influential proposal was that ACh levels may encode
the degree of ‘‘expected uncertainty’’ (EU) (Yu and Dayan, 2002,
2005). Operationally, EU was defined (in slightly different ways
across articles) in reference to a hidden Markov model repre-
senting the relation between contextual states, cue validity,
and sensory events. Notably, Yu and Dayan (2002, 2005) implic-
itly defined EU as a high-level PE, in the sense that it represents
the difference between a conditional probability (degree of cue
validity) and certainty. Despite clear differences in the underlying
models, this definition is conceptually related to ε3 in our model
(see Supplemental Experimental Procedures, section A, for de-
tails) that we found was encoded by activity in the basal fore-
brain. Our empirical findings thus complement the previous
theoretical arguments by Yu and Dayan (2002, 2005), offering a
A B C
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Figure 4. Overlap of Activations by Task Execution Per Se and ε2
Conjunction analysis (‘‘logical AND,’’ conjunction null hypothesis) of the contrasts testing for trial events and for the precision-weighted prediction error about
stimulus visual outcome, ε2.
(A) First fMRI study.
(B) Second fMRI study.
(C) Results of a double conjunction, i.e., the conjunction of the results from (A) and (B) across both studies.
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Hierarchical Prediction Errors in Sensory Learningrelated perspective on ACh function by conceptualizing it as a
precision-weighted PE about conditional probabilities (cue-
outcome contingencies). The precision-weighting of this PE
also relates our results on basal forebrain activation to the previ-
ous suggestion of a link between ACh and learning rate (Doya,
2002). This is because, in its numerator, c3 (the precision weight
of ε3) contains an equivalent to a dynamic learning rate (Preusch-
off and Bossaerts, 2007) for updating cue-outcome contin-
gencies (see Equation A.10 in the Supplemental Experimental
Procedures, section A and Equation 27 in Mathys et al., 2011).
In summary, our findings are important in two ways. First, they
provide empirical support for the importance of precision-
weighted PEs as postulated by the Bayesian brain hypothesis.
Furthermore, they contribute to the ongoing debate about the
computational roles of neuromodulatory transmitters (Dayan,
2012), suggesting a more general role for DA than only encoding
reward-related PEs and providing empirical evidence for ACh
involvement in representing higher-order PEs (about conditional
probabilities). Our results are compatible with the notion that
multiple neuromodulators may be involved in the precision-
weighting of PEs (Friston, 2009), but suggest separable roles
for DA and ACh at different hierarchical levels of learning.
In future analyses, we will focus on elucidating how these PEs
may be used as ‘‘teaching signals’’ for synaptic plasticity (ex-
pressed through changes in effective connectivity; cf. den Ou-
den et al., 2010). We hope that, eventually, this work will
contribute to establishing neurocomputational assays that allow
for inference on neuromodulatory function in the brains of indi-
vidual patients. If successful, this could have far-reaching impli-
cations for diagnostic procedures in psychiatry and neurology
(Maia and Frank, 2011; Moran et al., 2011; Stephan et al., 2006).
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Subjects
This article reports findings obtained from three separate samples of healthy
volunteers. The three studies used nearly identical experimental paradigms,enabling us to test which results would survive replication, both in the pres-
ence of monetary reward (behavioral study and first fMRI study) and in their
absence (second fMRI study).
The first sample containing 63 male volunteers (mean age ± SD: 21 ± 2.2
years) was examined behaviorally only. The second sample (48 male volun-
teers; 23 ± 3.1 years) and third sample (27 male volunteers; 21 ± 2.2 years)
underwent both behavioral assessment and fMRI (the third sample corre-
sponded to the placebo group from a pharmacological study whose results
will be reported elsewhere). We only employed male participants to exclude
variations of hormonal effects on the BOLD signal during the menstrual cycle.
The participants were all nonsmokers, without any psychiatric or neurological
disorders in their past medical history and were not taking any medication.
All three studies employed a near-identical audio-visual associative learning
task (see below). Prior to data analysis, each subject’s data was examined for
invalid trials. These were defined as missed responses or as trials with exces-
sively long reaction times (late responses; >1,100 ms in the behavioral study,
>1,300 ms in the first fMRI study, and >1,500 ms in the second fMRI study).
Subjects with more than 20% invalid trials or less than 65% correct responses
were excluded from further analyses. These criteria led to the exclusion of 17
participants in the behavioral study and three participants in the first fMRI
study; no participants were excluded from the second fMRI study. As a conse-
quence, the final data analysis included 46 subjects from the behavioral study
(21 ± 2.3 years), 45 subjects from the first fMRI study (23 ± 3.0 years), and 27
subjects from the second fMRI study (21 ± 2.2 years). All participants gave
written informed consent before the study, which had received ethics approval
by the local responsible authorities (Kantonale Ethikkommission, KEK 2010-
0312/3 for the behavioral and first fMRI study, KEK 2011-0101/3 for the second
fMRI study).
Experimental Design: Associative Learning Task
A cross-modal associative learning task (audio-visual stimulus-stimulus
learning [SSL]) was used in all three studies (Figure 1) where participants
had to learn the predictive strength of auditory cues and predict a subsequent
visual stimulus. Notably, this prediction was explicit and indicated by button
press before the visual stimulus appeared. The task design was near-identical
in all three studies; the only variations concerned: (1) response interval (800ms
in the behavioral study, 1,000 ms and 1,200 ms in the first and second fMRI
studies), (2) duration of the visual outcome presentation (150 ms in the behav-
ioral and first fMRI study, 300 ms in the second fMRI study), and (3) the pres-
ence or absence of trial-wise monetary reward (see below).
Stimuli were presented using Cogent2000 (http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/
Cogent/index.html). Trials were presented with a randomized intertrial intervalNeuron 80, 519–530, October 16, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 525
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Figure 5. Choice Prediction Error
Activations by choice prediction error, εch, in the first (A) and the second fMRI study (B). Both activation maps are shown at a threshold of p < 0.05, FWE corrected
for multiple comparisons across the whole brain. To highlight replication across studies, (C) shows the results of a ‘‘logical AND’’ conjunction, illustrating voxels
that were significantly activated in both studies.
See also Table S7.
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Hierarchical Prediction Errors in Sensory Learning(ITI) of 1.5–2.5 s. At the beginning of each trial, participants heard one of two
possible auditory cues for 300 ms, a high (576 Hz) or a low tone (352 Hz). To
ensure that both tones were perceived equally loudly, subjects performed
an initial psychophysical matching task in which they had to adapt the volumes
until they perceived both cues as equally loud (cf. den Ouden et al., 2010).
Following the cue, participants had to signal their prediction by button press
(right index and middle finger), as quickly and as accurately as possible, which
of two possible visual outcome categories (houses and faces) would follow.
These comprised a small subset of stimuli (two to four) from our previous
work (den Ouden et al., 2010).
Critically, in our task the cue-outcome association strength changed over
time (i.e., reversal learning), including strongly predictive (probabilities of 0.9
and 0.1), moderately predictive (0.7, 0.3), and nonpredictive cues (0.5). Each
subject completed 320 trials, divided into ten blocks of different association
strengths. Our stimulus sequence (Figure 1B) had two key features: both block
length (24 to 40 trials) and magnitude of changes in cue-outcome contingency
varied unpredictably across blocks. Over the experiment, this led to changes
in two related variables of interest: (1) volatility, and (2) precision-weighted pre-
diction error about cue-outcome contingency ε3 (a proxy to ‘‘expected uncer-
tainty’’; see Discussion). Please note that in our modeling framework, there is a
formal connection between the concepts of volatility and expected uncer-
tainty: ε3 depends on the previous estimate of log-volatility m3; in turn, ε3 deter-
mines the updating of m3 (see Equations A.10 and A.11 in the Supplemental
Experimental Procedures).
The probability sequence was pseudorandom and fixed across subjects to
ensure comparability of the induced learning process and thus model param-
eter estimates. Subjects were informed in which range the probabilities could
change but not about their order or possible values. Also, as in previous work
(den Ouden et al., 2010), they were explicitly instructed that the conditional
probabilities were coupled as follows (f: face; h: house; ♪=[ : high tone;
♪=Y : low tone):
pðf j♪=[Þ= 1 pðhj♪=[Þ=pðhj♪=YÞ= 1 pðf j♪=YÞ:
(Equation 1)
We ensured that the marginal probabilities of face and house outcomes
were identical across the experiment and could thus not bias the participants’
predictions. This was achieved by requiring that (1) the probability of one
outcome given a particular cue was the same as the probability of the other
outcome given the other cue (Equation 1), and (2) in each block, both cue types
appeared equally often and in randomorder.With these twomanipulations, we
ensured that, on average, before the cuewas presented, the a priori probability
of a face or a house occurring was 50% each. Thus, on any given trial, it was526 Neuron 80, 519–530, October 16, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc.not possible to make an informed prediction about the outcome before having
heard the cue.
In the behavioral study and first fMRI study, each trial was associated with a
potential monetary reward. Specifically, at the end of each trial the visual
outcome was presented for 150 ms in the center of the image, together with
a coin (5 CHF or 0.05 CHF) randomly located in one of the corners (Figure 1A).
Critically, reward size was uncorrelated to the visual outcome to be predicted.
In other words, high and low reward appeared randomly on 50% of the trials
each, ensuring that any cue would predict any reward with 50% probability.
At the end of the experiment, we applied a simple pay-out rule: 100 low-
rewarding trials and one high-rewarding trial were randomly chosen, and the
summed reward from correct trials only was paid out (note that the maximal
possible net value for both low- and high-reward trials was identical, i.e., 5
CHF). This procedure was used to motivate the participants to deliver
constantly high performance throughout the experiment: by minimizing the
number of incorrect predictions about the visual outcome, participants would
maximize their expected total reward.
Although we instructed our participants explicitly that the reward sequence
was random and could not be learned, one might wonder whether some sub-
jects might nevertheless have tried to predict upcoming reward instead of
visual outcomes. We therefore also modeled any putative learning of the
orthogonal reward and performed model comparison to quantify whether pre-
dictions of visual outcomes or reward would better explain the subjects’
observed behavior (see below). Finally, in the second fMRI study, we omitted
reward. This enabled us to examine experimentally whether behavior and fMRI
activations would remain identical when monetary reward were absent.
Hierarchical Gaussian Filter
For behavioral data analysis, we applied a Hierarchical Gaussian Filter (HGF)
that describes learning at multiple levels and allows for inference on an agent’s
belief about the causes of its sensory inputs (Mathys et al., 2011). The HGF
rests on a variational approximation to ideal hierarchical Bayes, which conveys
two major advantages. First, the HGF allows for individualized Bayesian
learning: it contains subject-specific parameters that couple the different
levels of the hierarchy and determine the individual learning process. Second,
the update equations are analytic and contain reinforcement learning as a spe-
cial case, with precision-weighted prediction errors (PEs) driving belief updat-
ing at the different levels of the hierarchical model (see below).
Here, we implemented a three-level HGF as described by Mathys et al.
(2011) and summarized by Figure 1C, using the HGF Toolbox v2.1 that is avail-
able as open source code (http://www.translationalneuromodeling.org/tapas).
The first level of this model represents a sequence of environmental states x1
(here: whether a face or housewas presented), the second level represents the
Table 2. Basal Forebrain Activations by ε3
fMRI Study 1 X y z t Score fMRI Study 2 x Y z t Score
ε3: Positive Correlation ε3: Positive Correlation
Basal forebrain 0 10 8 4.22 Basal forebrain 0 10 8 5.02
MNI coordinates and t values for regions activated by ε3, the precision-weighted PE about stimulus probability in the first and second fMRI study. Only
those activations are listed that were replicated across studies.
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Hierarchical Prediction Errors in Sensory Learningcue-outcome contingency x2 (i.e., the conditional probability, in logit space, of
the visual target given the auditory cue), and the third level the log-volatility of
the environment x3. Each of these hidden states is assumed to evolve as a
Gaussian random walk, such that its variance depends on the state at the
next higher level (Figure 1C):
pðx1jx2Þ= sðxÞx1 ð1 sðx2ÞÞ1x1 =Bernoulliðx1; sðx2ÞÞ;
(Equation 2)
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where s($) is a sigmoid function.
In Equations 2, 3, and 4, w determines the speed of learning about the log-
volatility of the environment; k determines how strongly the second and third
levels are coupled and thus how much the estimated environmental volatility
affects the learning rate at the second level; and u is a constant component
of the step size at the second level. Finally, the predicted probability of a visual
target given the auditory cue (i.e., the posterior mean of x2) is linked to trial-wise
predictions of visual stimulus category by means of a softmax function with
parameter z (encoding decision noise). Our three-level HGF for categorical
outcomes thus has four parameters. In our implementation, three of them
were free (w, k, z), whereasuwas fixed to4 in our analyses in order to ensure
model identifiability.
Importantly, the variational approximation underlying the HGF provides an-
alytic update equations that share a general form: At any level i of the hierarchy,
the update of the belief on trial k (i.e., posterior mean m
ðkÞ
i of the state xi) is pro-
portional to the precision-weighted prediction error (PE) ε
ðkÞ
i . This weighted PE
is the product of the PE d
ðkÞ
i1 from the level below and a precision ratio j
ðkÞ
i :
m
ðk + 1Þ
i  mðkÞi fjðkÞi dðkÞi1 = εðkÞi ; (Equation 5)
j
ðkÞ
i =
bpðkÞi1
p
ðkÞ
i
; (Equation 6)
where bpðkÞi1 represents the precision of the prediction about input from the level
below andp
ðkÞ
i encodes the precision of the belief at the current level. The form
of this general update equation is reminiscent of RL models. Specifically, the
precision-weighting can be understood as (component of) a dynamic learning
rate (cf. Preuschoff and Bossaerts, 2007); see Mathys et al. (2011) and section
A of the Supplemental Experimental Procedures for details.
In our three-level HGF, two precision-weighted PEs εi occur. At the second
level, ε2 is the precision-weighted PE about visual stimulus outcome that
serves to update the estimate of x2 (the cue-outcome contingency in logit
space). At the third level, ε3 is the precision-weighted PE about cue-outcome
contingency that is proportional to the update of x3 (environmental log-vola-
tility). These are the two quantities of interest that the fMRI analyses in this
article focus on. For the exact equations, see the Supplemental Experimental
Procedures, section A.
fMRI Data Acquisition and Analysis
The experiment was conducted on a 3T Philips Achieva MR Scanner at the
SNS Lab, using an eight channel SENSE head-coil. Structural images were ac-quired using a T1-weighted sequence. For functional imaging, 500 whole-brain
images were acquired in the first fMRI study and 550 images in the second
fMRI study, using a T2*-weighted echo-planar imaging sequence that had
been optimized for brain stem imaging (slice thickness: 3 mm; in-plane resolu-
tion: 2 3 2 mm; interslice gap: 0.6 mm; ascending continuous in-plane acqui-
sition; TR = 2,500 ms; TE = 36 ms; flip angle = 90; field of view = 1923 1923
118 mm; SENSE factor = 2; EPI factor = 51). In order to reduce field inhomo-
geneities a second order pencil-beam volume shim (provided by Philips) was
applied during the functional acquisition. Functional data acquisition lasted
21min. During fMRI data acquisition, respiratory and cardiac activity was ac-
quired using a breathing belt and an electrocardiogram, respectively.
fMRI data were analyzed using statistical parametric mapping (SPM8).
Following motion correction of the functional images and coregistration to
the structural image, we warped both functional and structural images to
MNI space using the ‘‘New Segment’’ toolbox in SPM; see Appendix A in Ash-
burner and Friston (2005). The functional images were smoothed applying a
6 mm full-width at half maximum Gaussian kernel and resampled to 1.5 mm
isotropic resolution. In order to optimize signal-to-noise ratio for critical regions
such as the brain stem, we corrected for physiological noise using
RETROICOR (Glover et al., 2000) based on an in-house implementation
(Kasper et al., 2009) (open source code available at http://www.
translationalneuromodeling.org/tapas).
For fMRI data analysis, we specified a voxel-wise general linear model
(GLM) for each participant. In the first fMRI study, this GLM reflected a 2 3 2
factorial design with visual outcome category (face, house) and incidental
reward stimulus (high, low) as factors. In the second fMRI study, reward stimuli
were absent; therefore, the GLM only contained the two visual outcome
conditions. Additionally, wemodeled missed and late responses, respectively,
by separate regressors. All regressors were convolved with a canonical hemo-
dynamic function and its temporal derivative. The subject-specific belief
trajectories, obtained from the HGF, were used in theGLM as parametric mod-
ulators. These variables included (cf. Equations 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6; Figures S1
and S2):
(1) ε2, the precision-weighted PE about visual stimulus outcome (that
serves to update the estimate of visual stimulus probabilities in logit
space);
(2) ε3, the precision-weighted PE about cue-outcome contingency (that
serves to update the estimate of log-volatility);
(3) c2, precision weight at the second level; this corresponds to the
learning rate by which estimates of cue-outcome contingency are
updated;
(4) c3, precision weight at the third level; this is proportional to the learning
rate by which log-volatility estimates are updated;
(5) m3, the predicted log-volatility; and
(6) εch, the choice prediction error.
Importantly, choice PE εch and precision-weighted outcome PE ε2 have
distinct definitions (see sections A and B of the Supplemental Experimental
Procedures for mathematical details). The choice PE εch is the difference be-
tween the correctness of the subject’s choice (1 if choice was correct, 0 other-
wise) and the a priori probability of this choice being correct. This PE is positive
when the subject’s choice was correct and negative when it was wrong. In
contrast, ε2 multiplies two components (Equations 5 and 6): (1) the precision
weight j
ðkÞ
i (that is always positive), and (2) d1, the difference between the
actual visual stimulus outcome and its a priori probability (also always posi-
tive); the latter corresponds to Bayesian surprise and is bounded between
0 and 1.Neuron 80, 519–530, October 16, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 527
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Figure 6. Basal Forebrain Activations by ε3
Activation of the cholinergic basal forebrain associated with precision-
weighted prediction error about stimulus probabilities ε3 within the anatomi-
cally defined mask. For visualization of the activation area we overlay the
results thresholded at p < 0.05 FWE corrected for the entire anatomical mask
(red) on the results thresholded at p < 0.001 uncorrected (yellow) in the first (A:
x = 3, y = 9, z =8) and the second fMRI study (B: x = 0, y = 10, z =8). (C) The
conjunction analysis (‘‘logical AND’’) across both studies (x = 2, y = 11, z =8).
Neuron
Hierarchical Prediction Errors in Sensory LearningImportantly, the GLM used all computational trajectories in their original
form, without any orthogonalization. Thus, we did not impose any judgment
on the relative importance of regressors for explaining the fMRI data. Also,
the timings of our events were chosen such that PE estimates were time-
locked to the visual outcome at the end of the trial; prediction and precision re-
gressors spanned the entire trial and changed at outcome, according to the
update induced by the PE.
Our subject-specific (first-level) GLM also included regressors representing
potential confounds. This included the realignment parameters (encoding
head movements) and their first derivative, a regressor marking scans with
>1 mm scan-to-scan head movement, and physiological confound variables
(cardiac activity and breathing), provided by RETROICOR.
In addition to whole-brain analyses, we performed ROI analyses based on
anatomical masks of dopaminergic and cholinergic nuclei. These included
(1) the dopaminergicmidbrain (SN and VTA), (2) the cholinergic basal forebrain,
(3) cholinergic nuclei in the tegmentum of the brainstem, i.e., the pedunculo-
pontine tegmental (PPT) and laterodorsal tegmental (LDT) nuclei. For the
VTA/SN, we used an anatomical atlas based on magnetization transfer-
weighted structural MR images (Bunzeck and Du¨zel, 2006). The basal fore-
brain was defined using the maximum probability map from a probabilistic
cytoarchitectonic atlas warped into MNI space (Eickhoff et al., 2005; Za-
borszky et al., 2008). This map included the different compartments of the
basal forebrain with cholinergic neurons (septum, the diagonal band of Broca,
and subpallidal regions including the basal nucleus of Meynert). Given the lack
of a published atlas for PPT and LDT, we used MRICron to manually trace the
region of these nuclei according to anatomical landmarks from the literature
(Naidich et al., 2009; Zrinzo et al., 2011). Note that we did not use these
anatomical masks separately to test for activations; instead, all regions
mentioned above were combined into a single mask image, and each ROI
analysis used this combined mask for multiple comparison correction.528 Neuron 80, 519–530, October 16, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc.Contrasts of interest testing for each of the parametric modulators specified
above were defined at the first level and entered into second level ANOVAs to
allow for inference at the group level. We tested for both positive and negative
effects of our parametric modulators. Please note that we only report results
that (1) survived stringent family-wise error correction (FWE) at the voxel level
(p < 0.05), based on Gaussian random field theory (Worsley et al., 1996),
across the whole brain and within ROIs, respectively, and (2) were replicated
in both fMRI studies. Replicability was assessed by testing the conjunction
null hypothesis, i.e., a voxel-wise ‘‘logical AND’’ analysis (Nichols et al.,
2005). In the main text of this article, we focus on activations related to predic-
tion errors; for other findings related to the remaining regressors, see Supple-
mental Experimental Procedures (Figure S3; Tables S3, S4, S5, and S6).
Bayesian Model Selection
To disambiguate alternative explanations (models) for the participants’
behavior, we used Bayesian model selection (BMS). BMS is a standard
approach in machine learning and neuroimaging (MacKay, 1992; Penny
et al., 2004) for comparing competing models that describe how neurophysi-
ological or behavioral responses were generated. BMS evaluates the relative
plausibility of competing models in terms of their log-evidences. The log-evi-
dence of a model corresponds to the negative surprise about the data, given
the model, and quantifies the trade-off between accuracy (fit) and complexity
of a model. Here, we used a recently developed random effects BMS method
to account for potential interindividual variability in our sample (Penny et al.,
2010; Stephan et al., 2009), quantifying the posterior probabilities of five
competing models (see Results and Supplemental Experimental Procedures
for details).SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
Supplemental Information includes Supplemental Experimental Procedures,
three figures, and seven tables and can be found with this article online at
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2013.09.009.
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